The Japanese village at Dugway
1 2020-04-30T18:05:51-04:00 Kate McDonald 306bb1134bc892ab2ada669bed7aecb100ef7d5f 35 2 Standard Oil Development Company, ed., Design and Construction of Typical German and Japanese Structures (unknown: Standard Oil Development Company, 1943). plain 2020-09-15T13:58:03-04:00 1943 Japanairraids.org. Standard Oil Development Company Public domain. David Fedman DF-0008 Kandra Polatis 4decfc04157f6073c75cc53dcab9d25e87c02133This page is referenced by:
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2020-04-30T18:05:49-04:00
Engineering Urbicide
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Planning for the destruction of Tokyo at the Dugway Proving Grounds.
plain
2021-10-07T12:58:28-04:00
35.7167, 139.8000
Tōkyō
40.21378, -112.75682
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
11/1942
1943
David Fedman
United States Army Air Forces
But while American audiences tapped their feet to these calls for retribution from the air, a growing cadre of engineers, chemical scientists, and intelligence officers began research into the campaign to actually achieve this destruction. Many different planning documents offer insight into the process whereby the US military-industrial-academic complex facilitated the shift towards indiscriminate firebombing of urban zones. As early as 1942, for example, cartographers in the OSS began to precisely demarcate Tokyo’s vulnerable fire zones—a point perhaps best evidenced in OSS Map no. 877.
While the style and utility of this visual intelligence varied considerably, one factor remains consistent throughout geo-spatial representations of Tokyo used to plan the raids: an abiding fixation on the Shitamachi district of the northeast. Planners took particular interest in the most densely built-up and inhabited Asakusa District, where plans estimated an average of 40,000 persons per square kilometer.
Architects and engineers doubtless had just this district in mind when, in 1942, they erected a model Japanese “worker's quarters” at the Dugway Proving Ground in the desert of Utah in order to understand how best to burn it to the ground.
Thus, at the very moment that USAAF commanders were publicly affirming their commitment to the strategic doctrine of high altitude precision bombing—and condemning the use of incendiaries in Europe—strategists, planners, and scientists were vigorously studying their application to Tokyo and its built environment (Plung 2018).
